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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN. V. DEERING: A DRIVER WHOSE
LICENSE IS SUSPENDED UNDER THE “IMPLIED CONSENT,
ADMINISTRATIVE PER SE LAW” IS NOT ENTITLED TO
CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE DECIDING
WHETHER TO TAKE A BREATH TEST.
By: Patrick Toohey
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held the implied consent,
administrative per se law (“administrative per se law”) does not require that a
suspected drunk driver be given the opportunity to consult an attorney before
deciding whether to take a breath test. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Deering, 438
Md. 611, 637, 92 A.3d 495, 511 (2014). The court found that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution does not establish a pre-test right to counsel for a suspected
drunk driver in an administrative proceeding. Id. at 635-37, 92 A.3d at 51011.
On May 3, 2012, Wicomico County police stopped April Marie Deering
(“Deering”) for driving her car without dimming the high beams and having
an expired registration tag. After detecting the smell of alcohol and slurred
speech, the officer asked Deering to complete a series of field sobriety tests.
Failing to adequately complete the roadside tests, Deering was arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol. At the police station, the officer read
Deering the “DR-15 Form.” The form advised her of the options and
potential consequences of declining to take the breath test and adverse test
results. Deering asked for an opportunity to call her attorney before deciding
whether to take the breath test. The officer denied Deering’s request because
of statutory time constraints that require the breath test to be administered
within two hours of the arrest. Deering subsequently agreed to take the test,
which indicated a blood alcohol concentration of 0.16. In accordance with
the statute, Deering was issued a nintey day driver’s license suspension
order.
Deering requested an administrative review of the suspension order. The
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upheld the suspension, concluding that
the denial of Deering’s request to consult an attorney did not violate her due
process rights because the officer had adequately advised her of potential
sanctions. Furthermore, the opportunity to call a lawyer is not required in an
administrative context.
Deering sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Somerset County,
which reversed the ALJ’s decision. The circuit court held that the denial of
Deering’s request to contact her attorney violated her due process right. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted the Motor Vehicle Administration’s
petition for certiorari.
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Under the administrative per se law, a driver has two options upon being
detained. The driver may (1) refuse the breath test and receive an automatic
statutory suspension or (2) take the breath test, which could result in no
suspension or a substantial suspension with the potential for criminal
prosecution. Deering, 438 Md. at 613, 92 A.3d at 496-97. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland sought to determine whether a detained driver, who is
denied a pre-test opportunity to consult with counsel, is entitled to have the
sanctions set aside as a violation of due process. Id. at 613, 92 A.3d at 497.
The court began its analysis by examining due process in an
administrative context. Deering, 438 Md. at 622, 92 A.3d at 502. In an
administrative proceeding, courts apply a balancing test by considering
“private interests, governmental interests, and the risk that the procedures
will lead to erroneous decisions.” Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334-35 (1976)). The administrative per se law is designed to protect an
individual’s private interest to drive, the public’s interest in deterring drunk
driving, as well as encouraging cooperation with the breath test to measure
impairment. Id. at 623, 92 A.3d at 502. The court articulated that in a purely
administrative context, due process does not require a right to a pre-test
consultation with an attorney. Id. at 624, 92 A.3d at 503. However, because
a detained driver also faces potential criminal prosecution, the driver may be
afforded greater protection. Id.
In the criminal context, the court has previously held that a detained
driver has the limited right to a pre-test consultation with an attorney under
the due process clause of both the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Deering, 438 Md. at 625, 92 A.3d at
504 (citing Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 717-18, 481 A.2d 192, 199 (1984)).
Subsequently, state and federal courts have not held that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a pre-test right to counsel
for a suspected drunk driver. Deering, 438 Md. at 628, 92 A.3d at 506; see
e.g., State v. Degnan, 305 S.C. 369 (1991); Brank v. State, 528 A.2d 1185
(Del. 1987). The United States Supreme Court has also cast doubt on the
right to a pre-test consultation. Deering, 438 Md. at 630, 92 A.3d at 506-07
(citing Nyloft v. Minnesota Comm’r of Public Safety, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985)).
Some state courts, however, have recognized this limited right in a criminal
proceeding, citing state constitutional provisions, rules, and statutes.
Deering, 438 Md. at 631-32, 92 A.3d at 507-08; see e.g., State v. Spencer,
750 P.2d 147 (1988); Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983). The
court’s ultimate inquiry rested on whether the pre-test right to counsel has an
effect on the imposition of an suspension under the administrative per se law.
Deering, 438 Md. at 631-32.
The court recognized that the Maryland General Assembly has made a
cognizable effort to separate criminal and administrative proceedings that
result from a suspected drunk driving incident. Deering, 438 Md. at 633, 92
A.3d at 508 (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 366,
739 A.2d 58 (1999)). Evidence that is excluded in a criminal proceeding
may still be introduced in an administrative suspension proceeding, given the
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minimal deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in administrative
proceedings. Deering, 438 Md. at 633, 92 A.3d at 508 (citing Richards, 356
Md. at 371, 739 A.2d 58)).
Ultimately, the court declined to extend the right to a pre-test consultation
to administrative proceedings. Deering, 438 Md. at 635, 92 A.3d at 509-10
(citing Najafi v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 418 Md. 164, 12 A.3d 1255 (2011)).
In dicta, the court in Najafi explained that even if any such right did exist for
the purposes of an administrative proceeding, due process protection would
be satisfied by proper disclosure of the DR-15 form and a reasonable effort
by an officer to accommodate a request to consult an attorney. Deering, 438
Md. at 635, 92 A.3d at 509-10 (citing Najafi, 418 Md. at 184, 12 A.2d at
1255)).
The court of appeals in Deering upheld the ALJ’s suspension of
Deering’s license, concluding that an opportunity to consult a lawyer is not
required in an administrative context. Deering, 438 Md. at 637, 92 A.3d at
511. The court focused on the legislative intent in the administrative per se
law to ensure widespread safety of the public, combined with the interest in
obtaining a timely and accurate measurement of impairment. Id. As a result,
Deering was not entitled to have her license suspension set aside on the
grounds that she was denied an opportunity to consult an attorney. Id.
In Deering, the Court of Appeals of Marylandy emphasized its support of
the separation between criminal and administrative proceedings. The court
found a lack of right to counsel in the initial stages of a suspected drunk
driving incident. The risk that the procedure may produce erroneous
decisions is outweighed by society’s interest against drunk driving.
Practitioners should be aware of individual’s rights overlapping between
different court proceedings, specifically administrative and criminal, in
drunk driving incidents.

